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Abstract The accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station was caused 
by an unprecedented Magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsunami. However, the plant 
was not well prepared to withstand such an unexpected natural hazard. Although 
defense-in-depth was supposed to be compensating for uncertainties and incom-
pleteness in our knowledge, there were weaknesses in the application of the con-
cept. This paper analyzes where the weakness was and why. Besides technical 
lessons, the analysis goes to the background of the weakness and concludes with 
the importance of questioning and critical review of the current practices and pro-
visions, and learning from best practices in order to continuously improve safety. 
However, it should be considered that this insufficiency in preparedness was not 
necessarily unique to Japan (its environment and other national factors). Hence, 
nuclear power countries and those new entrants launching nuclear power programs 
are expected to learn lessons from this accident, such as the need for continuous 
re-assessment of design basis natural hazards, understanding of where the cliff 
edge to core melt exists, how to increase distances to the cliff edge, and, above all, 
that technical fixes do not solve everything and attitude matters.
Keywords Nuclear safety · Tsunami · Defense in depth
8.1  Introduction
The accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station was not a black swan, but was probably a gray 
swan [1]. The technical problem that led to the multi-unit accident involving 
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core melt and fission product release to the environment was insufficient prepar-
edness for complete Station Blackout (SBO: loss of all AC/DC power) coupled 
with Isolation from Heat Sink (IHS) caused by the tsunami (see Chap. 2—eds.). 
The tsunami resulted in flooding of the Electric Equipment Room (containing 
switchgears, power center, batteries, power source for Reactor Protection System) 
located on the underground floor of Turbine Buildings of Units 1–4, which almost 
completely (with exception of DC power in Unit 3) deprived AC/DC power supply 
capability to safety systems as well as to other components required to function 
for Accident Management in Beyond Design Basis Events (BDBE).
Historically, tsunami had frequently hit coastlines in Japan. With the advent of 
knowledge of plate tectonics and other factors, Japanese nuclear reactor operators 
had discussed re-evaluation of Design Basis Tsunami (DBT) for more than 10 years 
before March 11, 2011. Nevertheless, decision-making on counter-measures to pos-
sible high tsunami after 2002 (when revision of design basis tsunami was made) was 
not done in time for 3.11 (hereafter the accident is also referred to as 3.11). 
Furthermore, progress in preparedness in the form of Accident Management to 
BDBE after the Chernobyl accident and the 9.11 attack was not fully developed, 
especially on two points: incapability to withstand extended SBO and IHS, and 
insufficient capability to implement Accident Management under disabled condi-
tions [given damage to Structure, System and Component (SSC), team, communica-
tion, etc. by external hazard]. Similar provisions as those represented by B.5.b1 in the 
U.S. nuclear industry to protect plant safety under damaged conditions did not exist.
This chapter discusses why there was incompleteness in preparation to the 
unexpected disaster in Japan, utilizing information from reports including accident 
investigation committees’ reports and other studies and insights [2–14].
The etiology naturally goes to the question “what was behind the insufficient 
preparedness and decisions by those involved in the accident, namely TEPCO, the 
regulatory body, the nuclear community, as well as those involved in Emergency 
Preparedness and Response (EPR)?” This discussion leads to national factors 
including cultures prevailing in an organization, the nuclear community, and soci-
ety as a whole. However, as researchers in safety culture argue, cultures are not 
good or bad by themselves but are good or bad at achieving certain outcomes.
8.2  Weakness in the Application  
of Defense-in-Depth Concept
Since defense-in-depth is the key concept for better assurance of nuclear safety by 
compensating for uncertainties and incompleteness in our knowledge, the review 
will start where there were weaknesses in the application of the defense-in-depth 
1
 Considering the event of September 11, 2001, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
imposed licensees, by Section B.5.b of the order, to take compensatory measures. This section 
was kept confidential due to security reasons.
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concept and why. For levels 1, 4, and 5 of the defense-in-depth concept, lessons 
learned, possible cultural attitudes, and others issues are discussed. However, the 
reader should note that this chapter does not touch upon technical lessons related 
to safety designs such as accident instrumentation, location of spent fuel pool, 
multi-unit installation, conflict between containment isolation, and use of heat 
removal system.
8.2.1  Level 1
Level 1 in the defense-in-depth concept is about Prevention of abnormal operation 
and failures.
8.2.1.1  Setting Design/Evaluation Basis
Guide for Licensing Review of Safety Design of LWR (de facto General Design 
Criteria in Japan, originally issued in 1970 and last updated in 1990 by Nuclear 
Safety Commission (NSC) [15]) required that, for SSC to perform safety func-
tions, it must be designed to withstand postulated natural hazards and to maintain 
its safety functions under these and other loadings, such as due to an accident. 
Though tsunami was raised as one of the natural hazards to be considered in the 
note [15], unlike for earthquakes, no specific guide for how to define its design 
basis nor how to evaluate its impact on nuclear facilities, etc. was provided on tsu-
nami neither by NSC nor industry until 2002.
The height of a tsunami depends on specific local characteristics such as sub-
duction plates, faults, depth of the sea near the coast, and the shape of coastline. 
For instance, indented areas in Sanriku historically frequently experienced high 
tsunami following earthquakes [16]. Therefore, each NPS site has its own unique 
definition of DBT. A construction permit and a license to operate the Fukushima 
Daiichi NPS was given based on TEPCO’s licensing basis document 
(Establishment Permit) that set DBT at 3.0 m by using the highest level ever his-
torically recorded at this site by 1960 Chile Tsunami. With the rising concern over 
tsunami hazard (especially after the tsunami that hit Okujiri Island, Hokkaido, in 
1983 and 1993) and the advent of knowledge about plate tectonics, the nuclear 
industry with the help from academia started studies to re-assess DBT. This 
resulted in the guide [17] by the Nuclear Power Division of Japan Society of Civil 
Engineers (JSCE) in 2002.2 Based on this deterministic guide, TEPCO redefined 
2
 Still existent in Annex II (Assessment of Tsunami Hazard: Current practice in some states) 
to the IAEA Special Safety Guide No. SSG-18 [18], the guide describes “The first step is to 
conduct literature surveys for dominant historical tsunamis affecting the target site, and then the 
validity of recorded tsunami heights needs to be examined. On the basis of the results, fault mod-
els for numerical simulations for historical tsunamis can be set up.”
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DBT as 5.7 m and modified the design of components in the seawater intake struc-
ture and control logics to secure net positive suction head of pumps required to 
function during and after a tsunami attack.
In hindsight, the JSCE guide had some problems: (a) Modeling of tsunami 
source started with historical (literature) tsunami records, rather than study of tsu-
nami deposit sediments, which can cover records of time periods before written 
records existed; (b) The guide did not appropriately (other than those historically 
experienced) deal with fracture of multiple segments occurring within a narrow 
time window as they had occurred on March 11, 2011 (the EPRI report [11] also 
points this out); and (c) JSCE had not asked for public comment to invite alterna-
tive views.
In July 2002, the Research Committee of the Headquarters for Earthquake 
Research Promotion (HERP) released “Long-Term Projection” [19] of possible 
earthquakes along the coastline off of Sanriku to Bōsō Peninsula facing the Pacific 
Ocean, in which it said a large scale (M8.2) earthquake can occur anywhere along 
the Japan trench. This coastal stretch includes Fukushima. TEPCO had expressed 
concern over this projection and had communicated [3] with this Committee. Also, 
TEPCO started further study on possible tsunami hitting the Fukushima coast, not 
necessarily to change the design basis but for evaluation, including (Fig. 8.1):
•	 Refinement of tsunami model;
•	 Probabilistic study (in 2006) of tsunami hazard (probability of exceeding 6 m 
would be less that 10−2/year in the coming 50 years and exceeding 10 m less 
than 10−5/year) [20];
•	 Calculation (in 2008) of maximum tsunami height by hypothetically placing the 
epicenter of the earthquake off the Fukushima coast (15.7 m inundation height);
•	 Tsunami deposit study;
•	 Possible new installation of tall break water wall off the Fukushima site; and
•	 Creation of an expert panel and internal Working Group.
Fig. 8.1  Re-evaluation of design basis and possible maximum tsunami height
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It must be noted that:
•	 The tsunami deposit studies, including that of Jogan Tsunami (AD 869) [21], 
did not necessarily help model construction for TEPCO, and JSCE’s guide did 
not encourage a deposit study nor base its model on a deposit study;
•	 TEPCO regarded JSCE’s “Methodology for Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard 
Analyses” [22] as being in the development stage, although it provided an 
opportunity for considering multi-segment failure given by logic-tree analysis;
•	 TEPCO also started to hypothetically place an earthquake source off the 
Fukushima coast where no record existed, got estimation that inundation height 
could be 15.7 m, and consulted with external experts;
•	 The idea of installation of a tall breakwater wall was abandoned due to concern 
over possible increase of tsunami height hitting the neighboring municipality 
adjacent to the Fukushima Daiichi site. No action was successfully taken before 
March 11, 2011 when the site was hit by the earthquake with magnitude 9.0 and 
tsunami with around 14–15 m inundation height; and
•	 TEPCO had regarded the results from external-event probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA) as not much useful due to significant uncertainty, rather than thinking 
it represents the state-of-art of their knowledge, and that the Operator needs to 
address possible consequences of beyond design basis by considering where the 
“cliff edge” exists when hit by a high tsunami as described before.
Meanwhile, stimulated by the Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami (2004) and oth-
ers, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), then the regulatory body, 
and Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), which provided NISA 
with technical support, jointly established in 2006 a study group on flooding. 
Experts in JNES recognized the risk of SBO if Fukushima Daiichi were hit by 
a significantly high tsunami, and their concern seems to have been shared with 
TEPCO, according to the Diet’s Accident Investigation Report [3].
Furthermore, the revised licensing review guide on seismic design (2006) [23] 
called for minimizing residual risk and mentioned tsunami as follows:
safety functions of the Facilities shall not be significantly impaired by tsunami which 
could be reasonably postulated to hit in a low probability in the service period of the 
Facilities.
NISA, in a meeting with operators, also called for attention to potentially small 
margins against high tsunami in the current fleet of nuclear power plants [3].
Defining design/evaluation basis of external events for its NPS sites is the 
responsibility of the Owner/Operator, although it may outsource necessary inves-
tigations to consulting companies. To fulfill this task, the Owner/Operator usually 
consults with experts and researchers, such as seismologists.
It appears that opinions of seismologists split, though not evenly, when it comes 
to a possible earthquake off the Fukushima coast: one camp considered that con-
tinuous slip of the Pacific plate could explain the absence of giant earthquakes in 
this area [24] with due attention to GPS data somewhat contradictory to the “con-
tinuous slip” theory, whereas another camp considered such earthquakes can occur 
136 A. Omoto
anywhere along the Japan trench, such as the 2002 long-term prediction made by 
the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (HERP) [19], but this view 
was not adopted by the Central Disaster Management Council (CDMC) as a basis 
for Disaster Management. It also must be understood that the theory based on 
tsunami deposit study failed to predict the tsunami height as the one TEPCO saw 
on March 11. Fracture of multiple fault segments within a short time period that 
occurred on March 11 did not seem to be the basis for the JSCE guide in 2002 [17] 
or for HERP’s long-term prediction in 2002 [19]. Tsunami height off the Fukushima 
coast was amplified due to superposition of waves from multiple segments.
On the matter of failure of the earthquake hazard map, which resulted in around 
20,000 casualties on March 11, a retrospective paper [24] describes “the presumed 
absence of giant a earthquake was implicitly interpreted as indicating that much of 
the subduction occurred aseismically,” and “the revised idea about the maximum 
earthquake and tsunami size were not yet fully appreciated and incorporated into 
the Japanese hazard map.” IAEA Safety Standards SSG-9 [25] describes: “com-
parison with similar structures for historical data which are available should be 
used in this determination” (design basis earthquake). Given the ring of subduc-
tion zone surrounding the Pacific Ocean, should Japan have assumed M9.5 (Chile, 
1960), or M9.2 (Alaska, 1964), or M9.1 (Aleutian, 1957) anywhere along the 
Japanese trench?
Comparative subductology by Japanese and American seismologists [26, 27] 
suggested the magnitude of the biggest earthquake in a certain subduction zone 
depends on local characteristics of the subducting plate (convergence rate and 
the age of the plate). Given this theory, it was considered that subduction zones 
like Mariana or Northeast Japan were different from that of Chile, or Alaska, or 
Aleutian. This notion seems to have prevailed, and apparently, influenced guides 
by JSCE and CDMC. However, the Sumatra earthquake in 2004 (M9.2) was a big 
challenge to this theory, since the expected magnitude there was much smaller 
(M7.9) [28, 29]. Given the Sumatra earthquake, Japanese seismologists re-
evaluated model, reviewed GPS data for status of asperity, and so on, until 3.11 
occurred.
8.2.1.2  Technical Lessons
There are many lessons as to how to define design basis earthquakes in subduction 
zone and postulated tsunami in the design of NPS: use of data from similar struc-
tures (SSG-9), study of deposit sediments, rupture of multi-segment in an almost 
simultaneous manner and consequential superposition of waves. Had CDMC 
changed its position after the Sumatra earthquake, things might have been differ-
ent and the casualty number of 20,000 might have been much less. Had TEPCO, 
under advice from some scientists, taken a conservative view and consideration 
of earthquakes in similar subduction zones, as indicated by the IAEA Safety 
Standard SSG-9, things might have been different. Now, based on this lesson, the 
Japanese regulatory body, Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), has published a 
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new tsunami guide which requires for Northeast Japan to assume M9.6 as a plate 
boundary earthquake with a note about giant slip and possibly released accumu-
lated strain by the 3.11 earthquake [30].
Since there remains a certain possibility that earthquakes or tsunami greater 
than the design basis can occur, consideration must be given to preparedness for 
the unexpected by:
•	 Where is the cliff edge leading to degraded core conditions?
•	 What means are possible to increase the distance to cliff edge?
Had TEPCO’s study, rather than focusing on what is the new design basis tsunami 
or waiting for uncertainty to be reduced, addressed the location of the cliff edge 
that may render the NPS to be in a serious situation and how to increase the dis-
tance to the cliff edge, then the accident might not have occurred. The cliff edge to 
go to core melt was flooding of the Electric Equipment Room. Even an assessment 
of internal flooding by a rupture in low grade piping in the turbine building could 
have found this vulnerability, especially given the experience of flooding of a part 
of the turbine building in December 1991 at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1.
The Operator is responsible for defining design basis external hazards and for 
preparing for the unexpected that may go beyond the design basis, and needs to 
discharge this responsibility by continuous re-assessment of such hazards based 
on updated information and listening to experts’ views including minority views. 
Since decision-making on external hazards is based on multi-disciplinary knowl-
edge, implicit assumptions even in a professional society’s guide need scrutiny by 
experts in other disciplines and the guide must be, before making it official, sub-
ject to public review and comment.
8.2.1.3  Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background
Basically, a possible underlying issue could be that there was not enough consid-
eration to preparedness for unforeseen events by increasing the distance to the cliff 
edge, thinking “Beyond Design Basis” can really occur. When TEPCO decided to 
raise DBT height to 5.7 m, TEPCO had also studied what might happen if a tsu-
nami was 10 m high. The study was relatively optimistic due to the availability of 
the Air-Cooled Emergency Diesel-Generator (EDG) located at a high place and to 
consideration of possible use of the ultimate heat sink (atmosphere) instead of sea-
water by containment feed and bleed operation.
Critical and reflective thinking was missing in the JSCE guide, evidenced by its 
insufficient study of deposit sediments and assumption of multi-segment failure. 
Sound decision-making on multi-disciplinary issues is not possible when experts 
in each disciplinary area do not critically review the work done in other discipli-
nary areas (called “vertical silo situation” [31, 32]) in the organization or among 
the professional societies. Compared with the JSCE study on tsunami, the Atomic 
Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) did not act to formulate a safety assessment guide 
by considering the possibility of higher tsunami beyond DBT.
138 A. Omoto
Plant engineers could have asked civil engineers questions on these points. 
Civil engineers also could have listened more carefully to a wide variety of views 
including alternative views by soliciting public comments.
Difficulty in decision-making under uncertainty and incomplete knowledge 
is a common issue in the area of natural hazards. Delaying decision by expect-
ing that uncertainty would be reduced and more information would be available 
unfortunately often results in fatal accidents. A huge uncertainty should not be 
used to justify not using insights from probabilistic hazard analysis. Construction 
of a logic tree could have given new insights, especially on multi-segment rup-
ture. Since supposedly around 10 % of tsunami occur by land-sliding of the sea-
bed such as Storegga slides [33] that presumably occurred 8,000 years ago near 
Norway, tsunami deposit study should have been considered for all the NPS 
located along the coastline at an early stage.
8.2.1.4  Possible Institutional Issue in the Background
Since Government officials (such as in NISA) are frequently rotated to different 
positions, it is difficult for them to develop expertise in specific technical areas 
such as tsunami. Also, regulators have no real plant experience in the absence of 
a nuclear Navy, unlike some other countries, and the limited number of staffers 
recruited from Operators due to concern over conflict of interest.
JSCE did not invite comments publicly before releasing its tsunami guide in 
2002, which is not the ordinary practice in establishing consensus standards by 
professional societies.
8.2.2  Level 4
Level 4 in the defense-in-depth concept concerns control of accident beyond 
Design Basis.
8.2.2.1  Assumptions in Accident Management
In light of the Chernobyl accident, provisions and procedures for Severe Accident 
Management (SAM) were prepared by all the Operators in Japan, which include 
hardened venting for BWR containment, connection of versatile low pressure makeup 
systems to the reactor for reactor water makeup such as by Fire Protection System 
pumps driven by dedicated EDG, and flooding capability to reactor cavity in BWR. 
A report [34] from the “Common Issues Committee” submitted to NSC reviewed 
the results of PRA by Japanese Operators, global trends in SAM, and strategies that 
could help prevent and mitigate the consequence of severe accidents. It encouraged 
Operators to prepare SAM on a voluntary basis. It also called for action by NSC to 
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establish a direction and framework for Regulator and Operators to act on SAM. 
In response, NSC immediately decided [35] to receive reports from Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency (NISA, Regulator) on an individual operating plant basis on 
preparation of SAM as well as PRA that forms its basis. For new plants, NSC also 
demanded Operators to prepare SAM before fuel loading. Probably partly to avoid 
impact to the lawsuit to “Establishment Permit” of NPS, i.e., to argue there is no fault 
in licensing practices under current regulations having no rule on SAM, no change in 
regulatory requirements was made until 2013 when the newly established NRA, in 
the light of the Fukushima accident, set regulations on severe accidents (Fig. 8.2).
There seems to be a prevailing misunderstanding that Operators did not imple-
ment hardened venting for BWR as was requested by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) in the Generic Letter 89–16 [36], but as the above description 
clarifies, this is not true. The report from the “Common Issues Committee” elaborated 
on specific SAM strategies. There was no mention about the capability of SAM under 
damaged conditions by external hazards. The report discussed differences between 
filtered venting and hardened venting in BWR, and found no significant differences 
since over-temperature failure in the drywell would dominate, by referring to Peach 
Bottom PRA. Since filtered venting does not address the risks from over-temperature 
failure in the drywell, the report emphasized the importance of cooling inside contain-
ment as well as suppression of Molten Core Concrete Interaction (MCCI).
In the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, Operator’s action for prevention of core 
damage, as shown on Fig. 8.3, was supposed to enable long-term cooling, after the 
short-term automatic response by AC-independent makeup capability by the use of 
steam produced by decay heat. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) 
and the High Pressure Core Injection System (HPCI) functioned for 2 or 3 days 
to sustain core cooling. In order to enable the above transition, Operator tried [4] 
Fig. 8.2  Regulatory changes after Fukushima [37]
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to depressurize the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) to send water 
from the low-pressure makeup system to the reactor core. Operator tried to resume 
power necessary for instrumentation, venting, RCPB depressurization, and water 
makeup by collecting mobile power units or batteries from automobiles. Due to 
lack of drills emulation of real accident conditions, it was found only at the time of 
the accident that the connection from mobile power units to the plant electric sys-
tem did not match. DC power from automobile batteries enabled occasional read-
ing of plant parameters. However, there was not enough power (air and electricity) 
to operate safety relief valves to depressurize RCPB or containment vent valves.
Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) nor SAM did not assume:
•	 Complete loss of both AC and DC power (SBO) for an extended time period 
and simultaneous IHS (although this assumption was not unique to Japan), nor
•	 Damages given by external hazards to Structure/System/Component (SSC), off-
site power, communications system, workforce at NPS, nor
•	 Hydrogen explosion outside of the containment vessel, although redundant 
recombiners were installed in the containment to cope with design basis acci-
dent (unlike statement in a report [13]). Possibility of hydrogen accumulation 
and explosion outside of the containment was studied in a Finnish paper [38], 
but it is not clear what action was taken to counter.
Especially, flooding by tsunami of Electric Equipment Room located on the under-
ground floor of Turbine Building and IHS (by damage to sea-water intake struc-
ture) by tsunami occurring simultaneously were beyond consideration in preparing 
Failure of AC-independent systems 2-3 days into the accident 
Core melt,hydrogen generation and explosion  
3.11 PM      Earthquake and Tsunami left the plant under
Complete SBO (AC/DC) + Isolation from Heat Sink 
Long term
Depressurize reactor system
Activate Low Pressure water injection systems
Accident Management
Short term
Core cooling by AC-independent systems: use of decay heat
as driving force  
automatic response
Fig. 8.3  Accident progression in Fukushima-Daiichi Units 2 and 3 [39]
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for the unexpected. SBO and Isolation from Heat Sink by tsunami meant common 
cause failure at levels 3 and 4 of defense-in-depth.
The experience of the 2007 Chuetsu-Oki earthquake [40] at Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa NPS prompted TEPCO to install fire engines, underground water tanks, 
and an onsite Emergency Response Facility (ERF) with seismic isolation design. 
Although seismic-resistant ERF helped greatly for management of accidents, mod-
ifications to the plant in order to increase SAM capability against external hazards 
were not sufficient against tsunami.
One reason why such damages by external hazards were not a part of the con-
sideration when establishing SAM, was that Operator’s priority in the 1990s in 
preparation for SAM was on enabling plant capability without losing time, while 
leaving issues of external events, such as realistic capability of those provisions 
at the time of earthquake [2], to a later stage. Operator waited for reduction of 
uncertainties associated with seismic risk assessment. However, later, attention to 
upgrading accident management capability to withstand external events faded in 
the aftermath of the following:
•	 Falsification of inspection records of components such as shroud and piping in 
the 1990s at TEPCO [41] had surfaced in August 2002,3, 4 and
•	 Move to amend the seismic design regulatory guide, such as upgrading the 
magnitude of near-field earthquake. TEPCO focused on the need for seismic 
upgrading of underground safety-class piping and the concrete structure con-
taining them in Fukushima-Daiichi NPS, which could be necessitated by regula-
tory change [23].
It may be worth to note that the fact that SAM provisions did not meet the high 
level of requirements globally was discussed in the IAEA international expert 
meeting held in March 2012 on Reactor and Spent Fuel as one of the issues sur-
rounding present day EOP and SAM.
The Fukushima accident raised concerns over the nexus between safety 
and security [42], since terrorists could have learned from the accident how to 
cause nuclear accidents, i.e., attacking offsite power, Ultimate Heat Sink (intake 
structure), and so on. After the 9.11 attack, U.S. NRC placed a requirement 
3
 Many BWR plants were forced to shut down for inspection and repair. Since this was an issue 
with significant implication to nuclear power generation, considerable management attention and 
resources were given to tackle this issue, rather than the hypothetical severe accident issue.
4
 Part of the falsification was driven by production culture but not necessarily all; part was 
relevant to regulatory interface. Japanese nuclear regulation has been based on the implicit 
assumption that plant is maintained in the same condition as when newly built. In fact, degrada-
tion develops upon use and components are not immune to cracking by fatigue or SCC (Stress 
Corrosion Cracking). FEPC (Federation of Electric Power Companies, including TEPCO) has 
long been (since early 1980s) asking adoption of similar evaluation and acceptance rule as fit-
ness-for-service evaluation and acceptance rule prescribed in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel 
Code Section XI (ASME Section XI) for Nuclear Power Plants, applicable also to SCC crack-
ing. However, this has been continuously denied from the regulatory body. Facing SCC cracks, 
TEPCO modified its inspection rule as if no cracks exist, while TEPCO had evaluated growth of 
cracks and confirmed fitness-for-service.
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to Licensees in the U.S. to install provisions and procedures to maintain safety 
functions under a postulated attack, commonly called B.5.b [43, 44]. Although 
Japanese regulatory body (then NISA belonging to Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry) had received information verbally in a meeting with U.S. NRC on 
this topic [45], no warning or information were given to Japanese Operators. After 
9.11, the nuclear industry and Operators’ efforts were focused on hardware; prov-
ing that missiles would not penetrate inside of the containment cause by terrorist 
attack or by the use of airplanes or missiles, rather than trying to find strategies for 
maintaining safety function under damaged conditions.
The report [3] by the Diet’s Investigation Committee raised the opinion that 
damage caused by the earthquake played an important role in the progress of the 
accident, which is more or less in conflict with the estimated scenario in Fig. 8.3. 
Though it is not easy to raise evidence to show that this hypothesis is wrong, 
TEPCO has this view that:
•	 Transient recorder shows functioning of safety systems as intended without 
trace of damage given to those systems or to RCPB,
•	 Given the magnitude of the earthquake almost equivalent to Design Basis 
(though time of continuation of shake is considerably longer in the 3.11 case) 
and seismic resistance capability as shown in Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake in 2007 
to Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS where acceleration exceeded design basis consid-
erably, it is estimated there was no significant damage by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake,
•	 Walk-down to Fukushima Daiichi Unit 5 on the same site and with BWR/4 gen-
eration design (similar to Units 2, 3, and 4) revealed no damage attributable to 
the earthquake.
The report [46] by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) on the Fukushima 
accident is also of the opinion that no damage was caused by the earthquake itself, 
and even if it existed, it had not led to core melt.
During the course of the accident, there had been cases of misunderstanding 
of the plant status, such as availability of the Isolation Condenser (IC) of Unit 1. 
This affected prioritization of actions and use of resources in the early stage of the 
accident [10]. This represents an issue of knowledge about design information by 
Operator.
This is also linked with the issue of not trying to benefit from independent 
check or oversight of strategies and actions.5 Unlike the U.S. or France, Japanese 
Operators had not institutionalized a system to deploy a shift safety engineer or 
shift technical advisor, who provides independent assessment on plant safety. This 
seems to represent a significant problem associated with group thinking among 
Japanese. A few days into the accident, TEPCO had organized a group of experts 
consisting of retirees to provide advice [6], but how the reports from this group 
were utilized is not clear.
5
 INPO report [10] quotes; “The decision-making approach did not provide for independent 
challenges or second check by other groups in the organization.”
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8.2.2.2  Technical Lessons
Simply said, there was lack of preparedness for the unexpected in the context of:
•	 Robustness of accident management, especially against SBO and HIS occurring 
simultaneously was lacking,
•	 Independence of each layer of defense-in-depth was jeopardized by external 
hazards, since provisions for both level 3 and level 4 failed due to a common 
cause (tsunami),
•	 EOP and SAM provisions and procedures did not assume damages given by 
external hazards, and
•	 B.5.b-like function was not considered after 9.11 in Japan and information on 
B.5.b. did not reach Japanese Operators.
8.2.2.3  Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background
Given that NPSs in Japan are located in areas prone to natural hazards, care-
ful attention had to be given to damage by external hazards to SAM provisions. 
Waiting for uncertainties of seismic risk analysis to be reduced was not the right 
attitude to take. One could have questioned why Operators were not assuming 
damages caused by external events in SAM provisions at the beginning of SAM 
deployment. Operators wanted to make use of all available onsite resources 
of SAM without losing time, irrespective of their seismic and quality grades. 
Operators had set aside this grade issue for later consideration.
Group thinking and the trait of not raising concerns could have been in the 
background.
There is a possibility that complacency also played a certain role. Lack of 
“reality drills” by emulating realistic accident scenarios and lack of concern over 
what was prepared in the U.S. after 9.11 may suggest assumptions in the mind of 
Operators that accidents cannot happen here. Issues of similar assumptions and 
not enough sensitivity to information (in this case B.5.b) could apply to Regulator 
as well.
To enable knowledge-based actions by Operator in beyond design basis condi-
tions, the Operator is expected to possess design basis knowledge. To what detail 
will be a matter of discussion. However, generally speaking, Operators are, as an 
intelligent user, expected to be knowledgeable of design—including why the sys-
tem is designed in such a way. With the life extension of Generation II nuclear 
power plants of more than 40 years in many countries, in other words, as plant 
life is exceeding the life span of engineers’ employment, component products, and 
even the company, chances are rising for Design Basis information to be scattered 
among operators, plant designers, and component manufacturers that may include 
those other than original suppliers. In this situation, Operator is expected to func-
tion as the Design Authority [47] for plant life after the plant has started operation. 
The culture of becoming the Design Authority and an intelligent user/customer did 
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not seem to be strong among Operators. Given the situation that, when a nuclear 
accident occurs, liability is channeled solely to the Operator whatever the design, 
the Operator needs to be thoroughly knowledgeable about the design of the plant 
it uses.
There was a possibility that concern over lawsuits (against the Government for 
licensing of NPS as well as against the Operator for incurring undue risk to the 
plaintiff by potential nuclear accident) and opposition to nuclear power intimidated 
Government officials and Operator to engage in continuous improvement to address 
risks including that of severe accidents. This also hindered open communication to 
discuss issues such as severe accidents and containment venting, even though the 
action of venting is justified to take a small risk to avoid a bigger risk. The situation 
is just like the “prisoner’s dilemma” where both prisoners failed to achieve a com-
mon goal due to distrust of each other. Likewise, the society and Operator failed to 
achieve the common goal of nuclear safety by distrusting each other.
However, we should not forget to look at the positive side. The professional 
attitude, dedication, and spirit of self-sacrifice shown by staffers working at the 
Fukushima Daiichi NPS [4, 9] to alleviate core damage and health risks to the 
public are really impressive.
8.2.2.4  Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background
Since Government officials (such as in NISA) are rotated to different positions fre-
quently, it is difficult for them to develop expertise in specific technical areas such 
as SAM, Severe Accident, or B.5.b. Recruitment of professionals knowledgeable 
about plant design and operation to the Regulator needs careful consideration, to 
avoid conflict of interest.
A mechanism of independent check or oversight of strategies and actions was 
not institutionalized in Japan’s operating organization. There was no system of 
shift safety engineer or shift technical advisor. The problem of group thinking was 
not well-recognized.
8.2.3  Level 5
Level 5 in the defense-in-depth concept concerns Offsite Emergency Response.
8.2.3.1  Identified Problems During the Course of Accident
Although overall offsite actions (Emergency Response) helped reduce health risks 
associated with radiation, many problems have been identified and mentioned in 
detail, especially in Diet’s Investigation Committee’s report [3]. The problems 
include:
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•	 Loss of offsite center’s function (coordination of offsite action) due to damage by 
earthquake to communication line and habitability under radiation environment,
•	 Confusion and lack of necessary actions due primarily to lack of knowledge and 
drills,
•	 Confusion in the line of command including Prime Minister, Government, and 
TEPCO.
A different perspective [48] has been presented that, since evacuation significantly 
degrades quality of life of evacuees and even may lead to physical and mental 
health problems, the necessity of extended evacuation could be better evaluated 
(not necessarily at the time of accident but before anything happens) objectively 
by not singling out risk of radiation but by using multi-criteria decision analysis 
such as J-value technique developed from a life-quality index.
There is also an argument by some experts that reduction of acute and chronic 
effects of radiation are not well balanced, and that evacuation was unnecessary 
beyond 3 km from the NPS to reduce health risk [49]. On the contrary, it increased 
health risk by forcing evacuees into a stressful life and reportedly even brought about 
death to more than 60 patients in hospitals. According to the UNSCEAR report 
on the Fukushima Accident [50] “No discernible increased incidence of radiation-
related health effects are expected among exposed members of the public or their 
descendants. The most important health effect is on mental and social well-being.”
Recognizing but setting these discussions aside, this Sect. 8.2.3 of the chapter 
focuses on practical problems that surfaced during the course of the accident in the 
area of the fifth layer of defense-in-depth.
A report on implementation of the Emergency Plan from the association of 
municipalities having NPPs [51] provides valuable details of how the Emergency 
Plan was implemented (or not implemented), what information source local resi-
dents depended on in deciding to evacuate, etc.
A Japanese Health Physics Society’s (JHPS) report [52] covers comprehensively, 
based on information including accident investigation reports [2, 3], the issues in 
Emergency Plan and post-accident health physics issues, including monitoring and 
ingestion control, computerized projection system, evacuation, radiation protection 
standards, exposure to the public and its assessment, exposure to the workers and its 
assessment, and risk communication. It is appropriate to list some of the identified 
problems raised by JHPS to help consider what causes were behind the issues.
Monitoring and Ingestion Control
•	 23 of 24 radiation monitoring posts were rendered unusable due to tsunami 
(physically lost) and loss of transmission line;
•	 Mobile survey systems faced difficulties (road, fuel, transmittal of data, etc.);
•	 Aerial survey was not available (not planned and needed modification of heli-
copter), while U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s “drone” survey started 
6 days after the accident;
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•	 Problems of contaminated beef were caused by feeding contaminated rice straw 
(Government alerted only cattle farmers and not suppliers of rice straw); and
•	 Management system for monitoring and ingestion control was not fully pre-
planned (procedures and devices).
Computerized Projection System
•	 Computerized tool was not available or not used, while Emergency 
Preparedness and Response (EPR) depended on computerized tool 
(ERSS/SPEEDI) developed by the Government;
•	 Emergency Response Support System (ERSS) was based on Safety Parameter 
Display System (SPDS) data coming from the plant but they were not available 
due to loss of DC power in the plants;
•	 SPEEDI (Dose Prediction System) was usable by assuming unit release due to 
loss of ERSS, but calculated results were not released from the Government 
(Cabinet Office staffers) to the public to help their evacuation;
•	 Calculation using SPEEDI was sent to the prefectural government of 
Fukushima after March 12. However, the staffers in the local government did 
not consider the use of this calculation in EPR. Consequently, out of 86 emails 
including SPEEDI calculation results they had received, 65 were deleted with-
out sharing even within the organization;
•	 Simulation of radioactivity diffusion in the ocean was not planned, conse-
quently not available; and
•	 Even though measurement was done for seawater by taking samples, nothing 
was done to check the level of radioactivity deposit on the seabed, whereas this 
deposit led to contaminated fish (flounder, sole, and other fishes according to 
food chain).
Evacuation
•	 Offsite center did not function for coordination of offsite activities including 
evacuation due to loss of communication and insufficient design for radiation 
protection;
•	 Local municipality and residents decided on evacuation based on different 
sources [3, 51] (Prime Minister’s Office, municipality, commercial media);
•	 Area of evacuation was changed many times as the accident evolved, which 
forced some evacuees to change place of settlement more than six times (for 
residents in townships of Namie and Futaba located north, more than 70 % of 
residents had relocated more than four times) [3];
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•	 Due to lack of information from SPEEDI to local authorities or residents, 
 evacuees headed northwest where the plume was spreading (leeward) on the 
morning of March 15, when release of radioactivity was largest;
•	 Questions had already been raised before the accident from experts on the use 
of atmospheric diffusion of released radioactivity and subsequent dose predic-
tion system in emergency response. The argument is that basically the basis of 
precautionary offsite action should be on plant condition rather than measured 
or predicted dose. The fact is that codes are not technically mature enough 
(ERSS cannot predict well timing and magnitude of containment failure. SPDS 
does not necessarily cover all the parameters that describe the plant condition 
leading to core damage. SPEEDI cannot predict well diffusion under condition 
of precipitation.)6;
•	 There was no drill before the accident assuming that information from ERSS or 
SPEEDI is unavailable;
•	 There was no clear pre-plan for the evacuation path and where to settle;
•	 Residents experienced difficulty living in sheltering zone due to stoppage of 
incoming food;
•	 Evacuees considered this to be temporary evacuation, and did not imagine it 
would end up becoming de facto relocation;
•	 Evacuation of hospitalized patients was difficult and ended up in more than 60 
deaths. Hospitals were supposed to establish evacuation plan on their own (accord-
ing to the plan by the local government), but it was revealed they had not; and
•	 JHPS report raised the role of local government as one of the key points to be 
scrutinized in light of the Fukushima case where lack of its capability faced 
with combined disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident became 
evident.
Radiation Protection Standards
•	 There was confusion about taking iodine tablets. Recommendation from NSC 
was handled by the recipient local governments inappropriately, and local gov-
ernments did not release orders, while certain municipalities instructed, on their 
own decision, the taking of iodine tablets.
•	 There were some cases of denial by hospital staffers to see contaminated evacu-
ees; and
•	 Standards have been changed by facing reality such as
– Screening level (for decontamination of residents),
– Exposure to school for pupils to play (from 20 to 1 mSv/year), and
– Allowable level of radioactivity in foods.
6
 IAEA Safety Standard [53] requires offsite precautionary actions be taken on the basis of 
 conditions at the facilities, before release of radioactive material occurs.
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Risk Communication
•	 Government frequently used the phrase “no immediate threat,” which was 
ambiguous. Recipients of this message may think “there is no risk” or may 
think “not immediate effect but, in the long run, there will be a health effect”;
•	 There had been cases of delay of disclosure (intended or not) of information or 
release of unclear messages from the Government and TEPCO, which fueled 
distrust from the public;
•	 According to opinion polls, 70 % of the public distrust information from the 
Government;
•	 Disparity in the level of knowledge between experts and lay people was occa-
sionally completely neglected in communication;
•	 Delay of notice to neighboring countries on release of slightly contaminated 
water (3,000 m3) to the ocean, though intended to avoid larger risk of spill-over 
of heavily contaminated water, invited distrust from them;
•	 Need for mental health care and for education on risk of low level radiation 
were raised after the accident; and
•	 The role played by the Social Media System (SMS) was highlighted in the 
Fukushima accident. There were cases of disguised authoritative information 
sources, which led the public authority to use authentication. TEPCO delayed 
starting the use of Twitter and heavily used PDF files in release of information, 
which frustrated the public. Generally speaking, neither the Government nor 
TEPCO had enough SMS-savvy staffers.
8.2.3.2  Technical Lessons
The following issues need revisiting and changes:
•	 Delineation of responsibility,
•	 Command line, coordination,
•	 Design and function of “offsite center,”
•	 Offsite emergency plan (zoning, drills, and others), and
•	 Mental health care of evacuees.
In particular, training of staff members to understand what obtained information or 
data mean, especially, preparedness for accidents by frequent drills, using realis-
tic scenario and education/training, would improve capability. Amendment of rel-
evant laws by addressing the issue of delineation of responsibility and to increase 
national capability in emergency response is needed.
Evacuation forces evacuees significant degradation of their quality of life and 
may lead to physical and mental health problems. Prior careful thinking of the 
value of evacuation such as by the use of J-value as a tool could have assisted 
minimization of overall risk associated with the nuclear accident.
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8.2.3.3  Possible Cultural Attitude Issue in the Background
The fact that serious “reality drills” and education/training were not in place indi-
cates that those involved were not seriously thinking “an accident can happen 
here.”
8.2.3.4  Possible Institutional and Societal Issues in the Background
Operators’ tendency to assure to local residents that no such accident could happen 
here to avoid uneasiness with NPS deprived residents of an opportunity for realis-
tic drills involving them.
There is no such organization like U.S. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) or Nuclear Emergency Planning Delivery Committee (NEPDC), 
which coordinates activities across different agencies in the Government for 
concerted actions. The Cabinet’s Crisis Management team in the Japanese 
Government did not function in confronting the nuclear accident. In an environ-
ment where ministries and agencies did not communicate with each other very 
well, coordinated action was difficult.
Education and training of staffers in local and central governments involved 
in Emergency Response could have enabled them to understand what actions to 
take and what is the significance of information they had received from experts or 
Operator.
Although a group of experts was functioning to provide advice to the Cabinet 
Office and meetings had been held on a daily basis with participation of politicians 
[6], it is not clear to what extent the recommendations from this group (such as on 
the use of SPEEDI information) was used in decision-making. There is a similar-
ity with the case of TEPCO in the handling of information from senior advisory 
groups mentioned relevant to the 4th layer of defense-in-depth.
8.3  Nuclear Safety Regulation
Characteristics of Japanese nuclear safety regulation were found in three 
points: two-agency system (not necessarily very unique), hardware focus, 
and frequent shuffling of staff members. Although there may be a criticism 
that the regulatory body NISA belonged to the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) and consequently lacked independence, NISA claimed 
it has “functional independence.” What is important is not the formality of 
independence but if safety-first decisions can be made without outside inter-
vention. There seems to be no clear evidence to support failure of functional 
independence.
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8.3.1  Two-Agency System
Japan’s nuclear safety regulation historically developed in two sectors of the 
Government, namely Science and Technology Agency (STA, currently part 
of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, MEXT) 
and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, predecessor of METI). 
STA used to be primarily for radiation safety and licensing of nuclear facilities, 
whereas MITI was for inspection of operating power reactors. As the number of 
operating units increased, licensing and regulation for power reactors were taken 
over by METI. Nevertheless, there were multiple regulatory reviews under the 
name of “double check” performed by the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC, part 
of the Cabinet Office separated from STA when STA was merged with MEXT) 
and by METI. Regulatory requirements were primarily formulated by STA, and 
later by NSC, whereas practical regulation using such requirements was carried 
out by NISA belonging to METI. This complexity had been criticized in IAEA’s 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission report [54], but this scheme 
had continued until June 2012 when the regulatory structure was changed in light 
of the Fukushima accident (Fig. 8.4). An NPO report on the Fukushima accident 
criticized this state of “lack of governance of nuclear regulation” by the two-
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Fig. 8.4  Change of regulatory structure before and after the Fukushima Daiichi accident
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8.3.2  Hardware Focus
A culture is observed in Japan in engineering and manufacturing to place heavy 
emphasis on hardware—component quality and reliability, which itself is presum-
ably a source of strength for Japanese industry, while being weak in system think-
ing. By benefitting from Professor E. Hollnagel’s insight [55], key lessons from a 
major nuclear accident can be summarized as follows:
•	 Pre-Three-Mile Island (TMI) accident era: Accidents are primarily attributed to 
failure of components, hence component reliability was deemed important;
•	 TMI: Highlighted human factor;
•	 Chernobyl: Highlighted organizational safety culture and SAM; and
•	 Fukushima: Highlighted Resilience and social license to operate [56].
It seems that the Japanese paradigm for nuclear safety had still primarily rested in 
the pre-TMI era. Three examples can be raised:
•	 Tendency to focus on component reliability and inspections (and inspec-
tion records) to assure this reliability, while not paying much attention to soft 
aspects (risk governance, culture, human factor), and systems thinking was 
traditional. The Japanese code for design and inspection of mechanical com-
ponents are mostly equivalent to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code 
in the U.S. However, unlike the ASME code (professional society’s code), this 
Japanese code became part of a regulation (Ministerial ordinance #501), requir-
ing Government examination of compliance to code requirements by review of 
stress analysis calculations. This focus on component reliability had also been 
subject of discussion as a part of inappropriate regulatory emphasis and prac-
tices in Japan together with other issues of Establishment Permit (PSAR/FSAR) 
and Operational Technical Specification.
•	 After the 9.11 attack in the U.S., the Japanese nuclear community’s effort was 
focused on proving containment would remain intact after an airplane attack, 
setting aside the issue of maintaining safety functions assuming the plant may 
potentially receive significant damages. Consequently B.5.b-like strategy was 
remote from their thought.
•	 In developing coping strategy against high tsunami, TEPCO was considering 
construction of a tall break water wall, while not trying to find where the cliff 
edge is and how to increase the distance to the cliff edge when hit by beyond 
design basis tsunami.
8.3.3  Frequent Shuffling
Although this is not unique to the regulatory body, the Japanese government as 
a whole had a practice of frequent (once in 2–3 years or even shorter intervals) 
staff shuffling, partly to cultivate wider views and partly to avoid collusion with 
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the regulated bodies. However, this is not necessarily an appropriate practice for 
nuclear regulation, which requires highly professional competence (knowledge 
and experience).
8.4  Differences in Plant Responses Among 17 Nuclear 
Power Plants
There are 17 nuclear power plants (Fig. 8.5) affected by the 3.11 Earthquake and 
tsunami. Why did only three units in Fukushima Daiichi NPS cause core melt? 
The gap (Table 8.1) between tsunami (Design Basis, inundation height on March 
11) and Ground Level (GL) is one of the key parameters, but that does not explain 
everything.
Three factors need to be considered to explain the different responses: Gap in 
elevation (tsunami and GL), Availability of power, and SAM. Figure 8.6 shows that 
the location of the Electric Equipment Room (EER) was a critical factor that led 
Units 1–3 of Fukushima Daiichi to core melts. Within Fukushima Daiichi NPS, 
three air-cooled Emergency Diesel Generators functioned as designed, one of 
which served electricity to Unit 5 (then to Unit 6 by EOP) saving Units 5 and 6, 
Fig. 8.5  Nuclear power plants affected by 3.11 earthquake and tsunami
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whereas two air-cooled Emergency Diesel Generators serving electricity to Units 
1–4 functioned but power was not distributed to equipment due to flooding of EER.
8.5  Cultural Attitude Issues
8.5.1  General Observation
For those who may have been watching Japanese nuclear energy from the out-
side and saw a series of incidents and accidents, such as sodium leakage in Monju 
(1995), JCO criticality accident (1999), falsification issues (surfaced in 2002, but 
Table 8.1  Tsunami height and Ground Level [57]
Note GL Ground level, R/B Reactor building, Tb/B Turbine building
Tsunami GL of R/B, Tb/B (m)
Design basis (m) Observed (m)
Fukushima-Daiichi 1–4 5.7 14–15 (inundation) 10.2
Fukushima Daiichi 5–6 13.2
Fukushima Daini 1–4 5.2 14–15 (inundation) 12
Onagawa 1–3 9.1 13 13.8
Tokai 2 4.9 5.1–5.4 (inundation) 8
Fig. 8.6  Factors affecting plant response. Red failure was fatal, yellow failure was not critical, 
green success
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bad practices were found to be existent since 1990s), they may have wondered if 
something might go wrong recently, felt governance by the Japanese nuclear com-
munity was weak, and thought some belt-tightening efforts may be necessary. 
To answer if there are underlying commonalities with the Fukushima accident, 
we must await extensive research based on fact-finding study; hence it is not dis-
cussed here.
Weakness of defense (in the context of defense-in-depth) may arise from 
inappropriate decisions and insufficient information available to decision-mak-
ers as well as uncertainties. Naturally, organizational culture, group culture (of 
the nuclear community), priority of management, and even national culture 
influence such decisions and decision-making processes. This section discusses 
such cultural and cultural attitude aspects that could have been relevant to the 
Fukushima accident. Four points are important to note before discussing this 
topic:
•	 National culture is a part of national factors influencing culture for safety.
•	 Cultures are not good or bad in themselves, but are good or bad at achiev-
ing certain outcomes [58]; in this particular case outcome is “achieving 
safety.”
•	 It is not an appropriate learning attitude to regard the Fukushima accident as 
a very unique accident that occurred only under a unique natural environment 
(earthquake and tsunami) and a unique culture.
•	 A warning was given in the “overview” section of the Kemeny report [59]: “We 
have stated that fundamental changes must occur in organizations, procedures, 
and, above all, in the attitudes of people. No amount of technical ‘fixes’ will 
cure this underlying problem.” This message should not be forgotten. Even 
though technical fixes are well established, the bottom line lies in human fac-
tors in successful prevention and mitigation of an accident. The holistic safety 
approach takes the position that human/cultural, organizational, and technologi-
cal aspects contribute to safety.
8.5.2  Related Studies
In autumn 2011, GoNERI (Initiative for Nuclear Education and Research by 
Global Center of Excellence) at the University of Tokyo commenced the 
study “Why the nuclear community in Japan failed to prevent this accident.” 
A series of interviews was conducted by GoNERI members of 24 well-rec-
ognized nuclear experts from Universities, Regulatory body, Atomic Energy 
Commission, Operators, Industry, Research institutes, Institute under the 
umbrella of Operators, and NPO critics. The results were reported [42] at an 
international conference, according to which discussion focused on three 
points:
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(1) Why was the nuclear community not well prepared for the unexpected 
natural hazard?
Answers were:
•	 The nuclear community in Japan focused on internal events in PRA and tsunami 
was outside its radar scope
•	 Generally, no question was raised to U.S. original designs (GE/EBASCO design 
placing electric equipment room in the underground floor of Turbine Building 
for Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 and 2)
•	 There was lack of communication and mutual understanding between natural science 
and engineering on uncertainty and margin in designs to cope with these hazards
(2) Why prevention/mitigation against beyond Design Basis was not enough?
Answers were:
•	 Operators’ culture for safety had degraded over time; they had shown signs of 
complacency, lack of sensitivity to safety-related information from outside of 
Japan, delayed action to alert, and over-confidence in nuclear safety
•	 Lack of tension between Regulatory body and Operators
•	 Operators’ staffers are generally too busy in caring for day-by-day problems
•	 Society takes risk-related actions and modifications as evidence of unsafe plants 
(“prisoner’s dilemma”), which delayed or prevented safety-related modifica-
tions for improvements
•	 Failure of safety regulation
•	 “Problems of culture were more or less recognized even before 3.11”
(3) (Since a number of interviewees mentioned cultural issues which were 
already recognized, a further question was asked) If you recognized seri-
ous problems beforehand, what did you do?
Some answered that actions such as below were taken in this context but were not 
enough to prevent the disaster:
•	 Creation of Japan Nuclear Technology Institute (JANTI) emulating U.S. INPO.
•	 In light of the 2007 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa earthquake, TEPCO constructed seis-
mic isolation ERC, underground water storage tanks, deployed fire engines.
•	 “Change culture” project (called “Renaissance Project” in TEPCO) in light of 
the falsification problem, Corrective Action Program (CAP) [9, 60] by learning 
from INPO, and by “Safety alert” reports, etc.
•	 Local Information Committee was created at TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site by 
learning from the French good practice of sharing information with local residents.
Others answered generally no significant actions (by themselves or by members in 
the nuclear community) were taken because:
•	 Operator is King, allowing no criticism from outside
•	 No question was asked about the nuclear energy program implemented by 
Operators under the National Policy
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•	 “Loose lips sink ships”
•	 Members in nuclear community are too busy to care
It must be recognized, however, these views were necessarily offered without their 
own detailed analysis of causal relationship with the Fukushima accident.
Another example is a paper [61] in INSS (Institute of Nuclear Safety System) 
Journal, which overviewed the organizational issues that may have been factors 
leading to the Fukushima accident or were observed during the course of the 
Fukushima accident, based on accident investigation reports. It claims it found 
problems in the context of the framework proposed for organizational excellence 
as follows:
•	 Consideration of residual risks
•	 Production culture
•	 Lack of preparedness to low probability unexpected scenarios such as earth-
quakes and tsunami
•	 Safety culture
•	 Higher priority on cost and impact litigation against operating fleet, less on 
nuclear safety
•	 Not enough disclosure and sharing of information
•	 Insufficient training of individual competence for emergency actions including 
severe accident situations
•	 Insufficient planning for emergency actions
•	 Insufficient use of lessons learned from past incidents
The study also noted that three areas have an outstanding number of identified 
problems: deficiency of safety infrastructure, lack of open discussion and informa-
tion sharing, and limited communication with stakeholders.
8.5.3  Link with National Culture
National culture is only one of the factors influencing the culture for nuclear 
safety. Others include but are not limited to: historically cultivated organiza-
tional culture, professional culture (component focus, weak systems thinking, 
Operators’ heavy outsourcing), institutional aspect of national nuclear system 
(Operator as a local giant stockholder-owned monopoly, Nuclear Energy pro-
gram endorsed and strongly backed by Government and implemented by 
Operators), interface with regulatory body, interface with society as a whole 
(“prisoner’s dilemma”) and local municipality (Government subsidies to local 
infrastructure building), relationship with academia (especially seismology when 
it comes to the Fukushima accident), etc. All of these are worth further study. 
However, influence of national culture in particular is picked up here, since 
understanding of this aspect may benefit newcomers when launching a nuclear 
power program.
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8.5.3.1  Collectivism, Group Thinking, Insufficient Critical/Reflective 
Thinking and Questioning Attitude, not Raising Concerns
There has been a general tendency in which the Japanese are not trained in 
critical thinking. No such training and debates have been a part of Japanese tra-
ditional education, which placed emphasis on transfer of knowledge and learn-
ing by heart, rather than teaching how to think. INPO report also points out 
TEPCO could have benefitted from additional questioning and challenging of 
 assumptions [9].
“Harmonization is our core value,” says the Article 1 of Japan’s oldest 
Constitution promulgated in year 604. People’s attitude tends to be one of not 
speaking out. In the area of nuclear safety culture, Japanese definition of traits of 
safety culture often drops “raising concerns.” Also, according to Prof. Hofstede’s 
international comparison [62], collectivism seems to be one of the salient features 
of Japanese culture.7
8.5.3.2  Lack of Big-Picture Thinking, Losing Sight of Substance by 
Being Distracted by Formality and Details
Unlike the argument by Nisbett [63], it seems that very often Japanese tend to be 
distracted by formality and details and forget the big picture. Rather than view-
ing something as an integral part of the whole issue, single-criteria (as against 
multi-criteria) analysis and decision-making are observed. The following is a case 
involving nuclear regulation in 2000s.
In the aftermath of the falsification scandal involving many Operator compa-
nies, Operators’ staffers consumed a significant amount of time in assuring con-
sistency and accuracy of the documents, partly by regulatory requirement. This 
blurred the focus on the significance of safety. Even after the Fukushima accident, 
insufficient dialogue between Regulator and Operator was often argued. This may 
be a case of distraction by the formality of independence and losing the basics 
of “what independence is for.” Independence is for assuring safety-first decision-
making and collection of information not only from the Operator but also others 
through dialogue, which serves well for informed decision-making.
8.5.3.3  Hardware Culture and Technology-Focus
This trait in the nuclear community is not necessarily unique but present in many 
fields of Japanese industry. Excessive hardware-focus, technology-focus, and over-
confidence in component reliability may result in lack of preparedness in case 
7
 INPO Fukushima LL report: “decision-making approach did not provide for independent chal-
lenge or second checks by other groups within the organization. … the site ERC did not indepen-
dently review and provide feedback prior to decisions by the control room staff.”
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technology fails. No analysis of causal relationship is available, but the observa-
tion is that these traits (hardware-focus, technology-focus and lack of prepared-
ness for technology failure) co-existed.
8.5.3.4  Positive Aspects
However, positive aspects were observed during the Fukushima accident, namely 
the dedication and professionalism of TEPCO’s site staffers. INPO special report 
[64] on the nuclear accident, November 2011 cites: “… Some workers lost their 
homes and families to the earthquake and tsunami, yet continued to work. Many 
workers slept at the station… usually on the floor.” TEPCO’s investigation report 
[4] Appendix touches on heroic acts by operators sacrificing themselves. 
Generally speaking, a utilities employee has the mentality of dedication to work 
for the betterment of society. Other virtues of Japanese culture include compas-
sion, politeness, and diligence.8
8.5.4  Future Directions
Possible cultural attitude issues have been discussed [65, 66], which may have 
existed behind the weakness of each layer of defense-in-depth. Discussions below 
are on the areas where transformation of cultural attitudes would be required for 
Japan to achieve nuclear safety:
•	 Change in priority of risk management by management of utility companies.
•	 Avoid complacency prevailing among those working in nuclear energy.
•	 Avoidance of “prisoner’s dilemma” situation prevented continuous safety 
improvement.




(1) Prof. D. Klein, former Chairman of U.S. NRC, wrote for The Ripon Forum [67], “In a cul-
ture where it is impolite to say ‘no’ and where ritual must be observed before all else, I think that 
Western style ‘safety culture’ will be very hard for the Japanese to accept. But there were also 
extraordinary—even heroic efforts made by the brilliant dedicated engineers, operators….” He 
also mentioned, “I do not doubt that the Japanese nuclear industry has the capability to transform 
to a nuclear operations safety culture.”
(2) Prof. K. Kurokawa in his Chairman’s message for the Diet’s Investigation Committee’s 
Report [3] (July 2012) said “This was a disaster ‘Made in Japan.’ Its fundamental causes are to 
be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture (our reflexive obedience; our reluc-
tance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our 
insularity).”
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•	 Enhance professionalism.
•	 Encourage questioning attitude, critical/reflective thinking.
•	 Recognize the value of independent checks to avoid falling into the pit of group 
thinking.
•	 Recognize the importance of being an intelligent user including being Design 
Authority.
•	 Need to learn global good practices. Need to learn from precursors, incidents, 
and accidents (The JCO accident in 1999 [68, 69], for instance, illustrates an 
example of production culture, lack of knowledge of design on the part of work-
ers, complacency.).
Further, improvements can be made in the application of defense in depth by;
•	 Assuring independence of each layer of defense in depth to avoid common 
cause failure.
•	 Setting Design Extension Condition to cover severe conditions not covered by 
design basis so that significant release is practically eliminated by strengthening 
containment function.
•	 Scrutiny of the quality of defense in depth by use of objective tree (IAEA Safety 
Report Series 46 Annex).
•	 Critical review and regulatory requirement.
8.6  Conclusions
The Fukushima accident was a gray swan in the context that such an accident was 
very low in probability but can happen, rather than can never happen (black swan). 
Can this gray swan be found only in Japan?
Probably not, if the nuclear utility industry is not well prepared and if prob-
lems exist in safety culture because: (a) insufficient preparedness of nuclear 
power plants, particularly to extended SBO coupled with Isolation from Heat 
Sink and to possible damages to SAM provisions, is more or less common, and 
(b) even though an attack by a giant earthquake and tsunami might be rare in 
other countries, other natural disasters beyond design basis may trigger similar 
accidents.
This disaster of some 20,000 casualties by the tsunami and subsequent nuclear 
accident in Japan, one of the most industrialized countries, may have been a 
surprise to many in the world. Germany, in its Ethics Commission’s report [70] 
that led to the phase = out of nuclear power in Germany immediately after the 
Fukushima accident, noted a change in the perception of the risk of nuclear acci-
dents because it had “occurred in a high-tech country like Japan” and “this has 
caused people to lose faith that such an event could not happen in Germany.”
Why was such an industrialized country not well prepared? Most proba-
bly, whether a country is industrialized or not does not matter, since human and 
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organizational factors, as discussed above, played a critical role. Presented here 
are five simplified plausible reasons:
•	 Complacency and consequential poor training for emergency situations, espe-
cially evident when we see confusion in implementing EPR (level 5 defense-
in-depth), but, in general, there seems to have been the prevailing notion of 
“accident will not happen here,” and “nothing much to learn from outside of 
Japan”.
•	 Delayed decision-making to prepare for unexpected.
•	 Over-confidence in technology: focus on component reliability and technology 
is probably linked to the optimistic attitude of not assuming failure of compo-
nents or technological measures, such as the case of SBO or SPEEDI.
•	 Lack of critical/reflective thinking, insufficient listening to alternative or even 
opposing views, and group thinking.
•	 Insufficient continuous improvements, partly due to “prisoner’s dilemma” situa-
tion with society.
The root cause could be said to lie in history, since this cultural attitude was devel-
oped during the course of development and utilization of nuclear power for more 
than half a century. Investigation of organizational causes (not only TEPCO, but 
including Industry, Government, and local government as well) would need his-
torical insight as was done in the CAIB report [71]. Also needing to be taken into 
account are national factors influencing the culture for safety.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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